The Future of Poland's Crypto-Asset Services Market: Navigating Regulatory Uncertainty

Introduction – Poland's domestic MiCAR implementation uncertain

For some time now, Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on Markets in Crypto-Assets (“MiCAR”) has been in force in the EU. However, its application requires EU-Member States domestic legislation enabling proper supervision of the crypto-asset industry, including crypto-asset services providers (“CASP”), and the performance of certain duties by entities in this industry. 

However, on 1 December 2025, the President of the Republic of Poland vetoed the Polish Crypto-Assets Market Act (the “Act”), leaving Poland's domestic implementation framework uncertain despite MiCAR’s direct applicability across the EU. This development raises some key questions for CASPs, issuers of asset-referenced tokens and e-money tokens, and other market participants of the Polish crypto-assets market, including EU-based CASPs aiming to provide their crypto-assets services in Poland on a cross-border basis.

According to recent research, around 3 million Poles already own crypto-assets and operate in this market, placing Poland at the forefront of Europe in terms of the widespread use of crypto-assets.

Polish Act – problematic solutions and significant delay

The Act was aimed at implementing MiCAR, as well as Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 of 31 May 2023 on Information Accompanying Transfers of Funds and certain Crypto-Assets (“Regulation 2023/1113”). Both MiCAR and Regulation 2023/1113 have been in force for almost a year now. This means that crypto-asset market participants should be able to operate under MiCAR (e.g. by applying for authorisation to operate as a CASP), and public authorities should supervise these activities (subject to the so-called grandfathering periods). 

From 30 December 2024, Member States should enforce the provisions of Regulation 2023/1113. So far, the lack of Polish law and its current veto, which pushes back the date of its adoption, means that doing business with crypto-assets in Poland comes with some interesting legal challenges.

The Act had been the subject of legislative work since February 2024. Whilst the Act was designed to establish a supervisory framework for the effective application of MiCAR and Regulation 2023/1113 in Poland, it contained several highly controversial provisions that drew significant criticism from market participants and industry stakeholders.

Requirements beyond MiCAR 

The Act included striking examples of over-regulation and gold-plating of EU law, imposing requirements that went beyond what MiCAR mandates. These additional restrictions would have hindered the harmonisation of crypto-asset services within the EU and placed entities registered in Poland at a competitive disadvantage compared to foreign entities able to passport their activities under the single European passport regime. Polish CASPs would have faced more stringent regulatory requirements than their EU counterparts operating cross-border into Poland, undermining the level playing field that MiCAR was created for.

Annual supervisory fee structure controversial 

The Act introduced a controversial annual supervisory fee structure, whereby CASPs would need to pay an annual contribution to cover the costs of supervision over the crypto-assets market, calculated based on the average value of total revenues over the last three financial years preceding the year for which the payment is due, at a rate not exceeding 0.4% of that average. This presented an exceptionally high supervisory fee burden, particularly as it was calculated on total revenues rather than net income or profits. For CASPs operating on thin margins, a fee of up to 0.4% of gross revenues could prove commercially prohibitive and would place Polish-registered providers at a substantial cost disadvantage relative to competitors in other Member States with more proportionate fee structures.

Administrative blocking of CASP websites

Under the Act, the Polish Financial Supervision Authority (the “PFSA”) would keep a register of internet domains used to conduct activities in violation of MiCAR. Domains would be entered into the register where they are used to conduct crypto-asset activities without the required authorisation or other permission under MiCAR. They could also be registered where used to conduct activities in violation of MiCAR in other ways if necessary to prevent the risk of serious harm to clients or crypto-asset holders. 

This mechanism would allow the PFSA to request telecommunications operators to block access to registered domains within 48 hours. It effectively allowed administrative blocking of CASP websites based on PFSA decisions. An objection procedure was provided, however market participants raised serious concerns about the constitutionality and proportionality of this administrative blocking mechanism. Their concerns focused on the length of any potential objection proceedings and the immediate blocking effect pending resolution.

CASPs requested to freeze crypto-asset accounts 

The Act authorised the PFSA demand that CASPs freeze crypto-asset accounts for up to 96 hours. This applied in cases of justified suspicion of violations of Articles 89 or 90 of MiCAR (insider trading and unlawful disclosure of inside information). The freezing would prevent disposal of or access to crypto-assets. This freeze could be extended for up to six months if, in the PFSA’s assessment, there were significant reasons to do so. The power to freeze accounts for such extended periods based on administrative decisions, without prior judicial oversight, raised significant concerns. These related to due process and the protection of property rights, particularly given the potential impact on legitimate business operations and customer funds.

These examples of controversial provisions presented above raised strong concerns that ultimately led to the presidential veto. This has left the Polish crypto-asset services market in a state of regulatory uncertainty despite the fact that MiCAR is already applicable across the European Union.

The Road Ahead: Navigating Poland's Regulatory Vacuum

Following the presidential veto, the work on legislation implementing certain aspects of MiCAR must restart. This creates significant uncertainty for the Polish crypto-asset services market and raises fundamental questions about the practical application of MiCAR in Poland. 

Many commentators believe that the lack of Polish implementing legislation can be interpreted as permitting reliance on the transitional measures (grandfathering period) referred to in Article 143(3) of MiCAR. This provision permits existing virtual asset service providers (“VASP”) and entities providing crypto-asset services that are not VASP services to continue their activities until 1 July 2026. However, even if a new Act is adopted before that date, 1 July 2026 represents the absolute deadline for operating as a CASP without authorisation. From that date onwards, every CASP must hold the required authorisation. 

Moreover, even if the Act is adopted before this deadline, the prospects of obtaining authorisation and completing the entire authorisation procedure by 1 July 2026 are minimal and diminish with each passing day of delay. Currently, there is no pathway in Poland for submitting applications or commencing work towards obtaining CASP authorisation. This may mean that entities currently providing services under the grandfathering period will find themselves in a legal vacuum: they will have submitted their CASP authorisation applications, their entitlement to provide services under the grandfathering period will have expired, yet the authorisation procedure will not yet have been completed. 

This risk has not gone unnoticed at the European level. On 4 December 2025, ESMA issued its “Statement on MiCA Transitional Measures” (ESMA75-113276571-1631), providing guidance for entities operating under the grandfathering period. ESMA emphasised that entities benefiting from transitional measures but not yet holding a CASP authorisation should have orderly wind-down plans in place. Furthermore, ESMA calls on national competent authorities to carefully examine all last-minute authorisation applications to maintain regulatory standards.

If a new Act is not adopted by 1 July 2026, providing crypto-asset services in Poland after that date will be prohibited. The only theoretical exceptions would be cross-border activities based on the single European passport and activities conducted under a reverse solicitation model. 

However, cross-border activity based on the single European passport may prove problematic in practice. The absence of the Act means that Poland will have no authority acting as the national competent authority (the “NCA”) for MiCAR purposes. This raises legitimate questions about the actual and practical ability of a home Member State NCA to transmit passport notifications to Poland. Thus, from a practical standpoint, the question of conducting cross-border activities based on Article 65 of MiCAR remains open. However, the EU legislator has provided a fall-back plan that could be employed in this situation. According to Article 65(4) of MiCAR, CASPs could commence providing cross-border services 15 days after the notification was submitted, even if the host Member State's NCA does not respond to the passport notification.

This regulatory vacuum creates considerable uncertainty for both Polish market participants and foreign CASPs seeking to passport their services into Poland.

Poland at a Crossroads

The future of the Act remains highly uncertain. Time is running out for its preparation, and the window for meaningful implementation before the 1 July 2026 deadline is rapidly closing. 

Some commentators suggest that the preparation of a new act that would be drastically shorter and less rigorous than the vetoed legislation. Whilst a more proportionate approach would be welcomed, some proposals raise concerns about practical implementation. In particular, some commentators propose that a new authority, other than the PFSA, should be designated as the supervisory body for MiCAR purposes. This approach warrants careful scrutiny. For instance, e-money token issuers would be subject to PFSA supervision in respect of their activities as credit institutions or electronic money institutions, whilst simultaneously being supervised by a new authority as to their activities as e-money token issuers. Similarly, CASPs that are also other financial market participants operating under the notification procedure in Article 60 of MiCAR would face dual supervision. For example, an investment firm providing reception and transmission of orders relating to financial instruments would be supervised by the PFSA, whilst the same firm providing reception and transmission of orders relating to crypto-assets would be supervised by a new authority. Such fragmentation of supervisory responsibilities could create regulatory complexity and coordination challenges. 

Poland currently finds itself significantly delayed and in a difficult position regarding crypto-asset market regulation. However, there is hope that the presidential veto and the abovementioned problems will contribute to greater reflection, ultimately creating more favourable conditions for conducting crypto-asset business in Poland. A well-designed regulatory framework could support the vibrant Polish crypto-market whilst ensuring appropriate investor protection and market integrity.