On 3 February 2026, the Swedish Competition Authority (the "SCA") submitted its consultation response to two Government Official Reports published last year (available in Swedish here).
One proposal highlighted in the consultation response is to strengthen the SCA's merger control powers by removing the current SEK 1 billion turnover requirement for "call-in" reviews. Under the current framework, a “call-in” means that the SCA can require parties to notify a transaction that is otherwise non-notifiable, provided that the parties’ combined turnover exceeds SEK 1 billion and there are specific grounds to believe the concentration may distort competition (see also our article on call-in in the Nordics).
The SCA supports this proposal. In its consultation response, the SCA puts forward a case from last year, where it examined a non-notifiable concentration in the media monitoring sector as a potential abuse of dominance (the decision is available in Swedish here). The SCA relied on the ECJ’s Towercast judgment to justify this ex-post scrutiny of the merger under antitrust rules rather than merger control provisions. Meanwhile, Norway reviewed the very same transaction under its merger rules (which permit review below specified turnover thresholds). After Norway cleared the deal (following commitments to address competition concerns), the SCA chose to close the case. In its consultation response, the SCA observed that the Norwegian approach proved more efficient and less resource-intensive than pursuing an abuse-of-dominance investigation.
At this stage, the proposal remains part of a government report. Before any change can take effect, it must be translated into a government bill and adopted by the Swedish Parliament. That said, both the proposal and the SCA's support of it reflect a broader EU-wide effort to close the enforcement gap for below-threshold transactions that raise competition concerns. Sweden's proposed reform would address this ex-ante by enabling easier call-in and merger reviews of such deals. Elsewhere in the EU, authorities have tackled the same gap ex-post via antitrust enforcement – illustrated, for example, by the French Competition Authority's scrutiny of the Doctolib acquisition under Article 102 TFEU, despite the transaction falling below notification thresholds, and Belgium's interventions in cases such as Proximus/EDPnet, where the Towercast precedent has cast a significant shadow over merger control practice.
If you need more information or further guidance in this area, please contact Morten Nissen or Rakel Rosshagen.