Hungary: GVH can now restructure markets without infringement findings - Who should worry?

In the mining (solid mineral and raw materials) and construction sector, the Hungarian Competition Office (GVH) may impose serious obligations, such as the separation or sale of a business or part of a business, even without finding a violation of the law. This is due to a recent amendment to the Competition Act. 

The Hungarian Parliament adopted the amendment to Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair Market Practices and Restrictions on Competition, which was still awaiting promulgation on 12 December 2025, giving the GVH new powerful tools to intervene in the market structure of certain sectors even in the absence of a competition law infringement.

1. Who and what does the GVH investigate?

Only two key sectors are affected: the mining (solid mineral and raw materials) and the construction industry.

The GVH's procedure consists of two steps: (i) an accelerated sector inquiry, followed by (ii) a competition control procedure.

1. Accelerated sector inquiry – cross-market significance

The accelerated sector inquiry is itself a relatively new tool in the GVH's arsenal, which it uses quite frequently. The GVH was one of the first to deal with the construction industry: in 2022, it conducted an investigation into the market for thermal insulation materials and wood construction materials, and in 2021, it investigated the market for ceramic masonry units. It is important to note that during the investigation, the GVH may even conduct dawn raids on the companies concerned.

In an accelerated sector inquiry, the GVH essentially assesses whether there is a group of companies in the given market that has "paramount significance for competition across markets". The criteria for this are the given group of companies':

• market share;
• financial strength or access to other resources;
• vertical integration or activities in other related markets;
• access to relevant competitive data;
• the fundamental importance of the services provided or goods produced or distributed by the undertaking for consumers or the economy;
• the importance of the undertaking's activities for third parties or consumers in terms of access to purchase and sales markets, and in this context, the influence of the undertaking on the business activities of third parties.

It is clear that the criteria for determining “paramount significance for competition across markets” are very general and do not set out any specific method of assessment or thresholds for determining when this situation exists.

2. Competition supervision procedure – significant and continuous distortion of competition

If the GVH establishes "paramount significance for competition across markets" as a result of the accelerated sector inquiry, it will initiate a competition control procedure. At this stage, the GVH will examine whether there is a "significant and continuous distortion or restriction of competition", more specifically, whether: 

• it has existed continuously for at least two years prior to the initiation of the accelerated sector inquiry, or
• it has occurred repeatedly within the three years prior to the initiation of the accelerated sector inquiry.

A special feature of the procedure is that the GVH is obliged to request the opinion of the Supervisory Authority for Regulatory Affairs of Hungary (SZTFH) at the same time as initiating the competition control procedure. Even more unusual is that the GVH is bound by the opinion of the SZTFH as the competent authority. 

2. How sharp is this sword? – Imposition of obligations

If the GVH finds “significant and continuous distortion or restriction of competition” as a result of the competition control procedure, it may impose proportionate obligations necessary to eliminate the distortion or restriction of competition. As such obligations, the GVH:

• may impose a behavioral obligation (i) prohibiting the preferential treatment of offers within the group of undertakings and (ii) requiring that such offers be made available to other undertakings, as well as (iii) imposing an obligation to provide information on the performance and quality of the service provided,
• as a structural obligation, may require the owners to accept undertakings with "paramount significance for competition across markets" to sell all or part of their shareholdings, or undertakings with "paramount significance for competition across markets" to sell all or part of their assets.

The most striking feature of this new procedure is that the GVH may impose the above obligation without finding an infringement.

3. How will this work?

The economic importance of the Hungarian construction industry and the GVH's activity in this market suggests that this new “sword” will not remain in its sheath for long. However, it remains to be seen how the GVH will manage the implementation of the specific features defined by the legislator - particularly the new conceptual system and the broadly defined investigation criteria - and how the courts will interpret them. We are also curious whether the amendments will have to withstand scrutiny by the Constitutional Court and possibly the Court of Justice of the European Union - and, if so, when

If you need more information or further guidance in this area, please contact Dániel Arányi and Gabor Kutai.

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